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A	  Sustainable	  Music	  Industry	  for	  the	  21st	  Century	  	   Aloe	  Blacc1	  	  Irina	  D.	  Manta2	  	  David	  S.	  Olson3	  	  
Introduction	  	   Jay	   Z	   and	   other	   musicians	   recently	   made	   headlines	   for	   purchasing	   the	  streaming	  service	  Tidal	  for	  $54	  million	  that	  musicians	  would	  run	  themselves.4	  Why	  have	  celebrities	   like	  him,	  Madonna,	  and	  Alicia	  Keys	  decided	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  music	  distribution?5	  One	   clue	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   songwriters	  who	  created	  Avicii’s	  2013	   megahit	   “Wake	   Me	   Up!”	   made	   shockingly	   little	   money	   from	   the	   over	   168	  million	  times	  that	  the	  song	  was	  streamed	  on	  Pandora	  in	  the	  U.S.	  alone.6	  Indeed,	  the	  three	  songwriters	  and	  their	  publishers	  earned	  just	  $12,359	  total.7	  John	  Legend’s	  “All	  of	  Me”	  was	  streamed	  55	  million	  times	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2014	  but	  generated	  only	  $3,400	   in	   publisher	   and	   songwriter	   royalties.8	   During	   the	   same	   period,	   Pharrell	  Williams’s	   “Happy”	   had	   43	   million	   Pandora	   streams	   and	   produced	   $2,700	   in	  songwriter	  royalties.9	  If	  hit	  songs	  result	  in	  streaming	  profits	  that	  are	  this	  low,	  what	  is	   to	   become	   of	   the	   average	   songwriter	   in	   a	   world	   that	   relies	   increasingly	   on	  streaming	  services	  for	  music	  distribution?	  	  With	   the	   pay	   so	   low,	  why	   don’t	   songwriters	   just	   remove	   their	  music	   from	  streaming	  services	   like	  Taylor	  Swift	  did?10	  For	   that	  matter,	  why	  did	  Taylor	  Swift’s	  music	  remain	  on	  Pandora?	  Did	  Pandora	  provide	  her	  with	  a	  better	  deal	  than	  Spotify?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  GRAMMY-­‐nominated	  singer,	  songwriter,	  and	  artivist	  best	  known	  for	  the	  hit	  singles	  “I	  Need	  a	  Dollar”	  and	   “I’m	   the	   Man.”	   Sings	   on	   and	   co-­‐wrote	   the	   No.	   1	   hit	   “Wake	   Me	   Up!”	   by	   Avicii.	   University	   of	  Southern	  California,	  B.A.	  2	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  Director	  of	  the	  Hofstra	  Center	  for	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  Maurice	  A.	  Deane	  School	  of	  Law	  at	  Hofstra	  University;	  Yale	  Law	  School,	  J.D.;	  Yale	  College,	  B.A.	  3	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Boston	  College	  Law	  School;	  Harvard	  Law	  School,	  J.D.;	  University	  of	  Kansas,	  B.A.	  We	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Robert	  Brauneis,	  Lydia	  Loren,	  and	  Zvi	  Rosen	  for	  helpful	  suggestions.	  	  4	  James	  Cook,	  Jay	  Z	  Is	  Buying	  One	  of	  Spotify’s	  Biggest	  Rivals	  for	  $56	  Million,	  BUSINESS	  INSIDER,	  Jan.	  30,	  2015,	  http://www.businessinsider.com/jay-­‐z-­‐buys-­‐wimp-­‐and-­‐tidal-­‐streaming-­‐services-­‐2015-­‐1.	  5	  Jay	  Z,	  Alicia	  Keys,	  Madonna	  and	  Others	  Align	  for	  New	  Streaming	  Service,	  YAHOO	  MUSIC,	  Mar.	  30,	  2015,	  https://music.yahoo.com/blogs/live-­‐nation/jay-­‐z-­‐to-­‐make-­‐waves-­‐with-­‐new-­‐tidal-­‐streaming-­‐service-­‐165038504.html.	  6	  Aloe	  Blacc,	  Aloe	  Blacc:	  Streaming	  Services	  Need	  to	  Pay	  Songwriters	  Fairly,	  WIRED,	  Nov.	  5,	  2014,	  http://www.wired.com/2014/11/aloe-­‐blacc-­‐pay-­‐songwriters/.	  7	  Id.	  	  8	  Ed	  Christman,	  Sony/ATV	  Chairman	  Blasts	  Payouts	  From	  Internet	  Radio,	  BILLBOARD,	  Dec.	  11,	  2014,	  https://www.billboard.com/articles/6405565/sony-­‐atv-­‐chairman-­‐pandora-­‐payouts.	  9	  Id.	  	  10	  See	  Jack	  Linshi,	  Here’s	  Why	  Taylor	  Swift	  Pulled	  Her	  Music	  From	  Spotify,	  TIME,	  Nov.	  3,	  2014,	  http://time.com/3554468/why-­‐taylor-­‐swift-­‐spotify/.	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The	  answer	  is	  that	  copyright	  law	  gives	  Taylor	  Swift	  the	  power	  to	  remove	  her	  sound	  recordings	   from	   interactive	   streaming	   services	   like	   Spotify,	   but	   not	   from	   “non-­‐interactive”	  services	  like	  Pandora.11	  Those	  who	  own	  the	  copyright	  in	  the	  underlying	  music	   composition	   do	   not	   get	   to	   remove	   their	   work	   from	   either.12	   Both	   music	  composers	   and	   performers	   sometimes	   have	   very	   little	   control	   over	   their	  copyrighted	   works	   because—unlike	   for	   any	   other	   art	   form	   covered	   by	   copyright	  law—music	  copyrights	  are	  governed	  by	  a	  bizarrely	  complex	  scheme	  that	  often	  lets	  others	   use	   a	   copyright	   owner’s	   works	   without	   permission	   or	   price	   negotiation.13	  This	  scheme	  is	  not	   fair,	  and	  even	  worse,	   it	  warps	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	   the	  music	  industry,	  often	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  artists	  and	  fans	  alike.	  	  	  	  
I.	  Music	  Copyrights	  and	  Compulsory	  Licensing	  	  The	  holders	  of	  music	   copyrights	  are	   treated	  differently	   from	  the	  holders	  of	  every	  other	  type	  of	  copyright	  even	  though	  there	  is	  nothing	  distinctive	  about	  music	  that	   necessitates	   the	   government’s	   compelling	   music	   copyright	   holders	   to	   share	  their	   works.	   The	   reason	   that	   the	   control	   afforded	   to	   music	   copyright	   holders	   is	  severely	   limited	   is	   the	  historical	   evolution	  of	   copyright	   law	   itself.14	  There	  are	   two	  types	   of	   federal	  music	   copyrights:	   a	   composition	   copyright,	   which	   belongs	   to	   the	  songwriter,	  and	  a	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  which	  belongs	  to	  the	  performer	  who	  recorded	  the	  song	  (this	  latter	  copyright	  is	  often	  transferred	  to	  the	  record	  label).15	  A	  combination	  of	  three	  elements	  governing	  these	  two	  types	  of	  music	  copyrights	  have	  combined	  to	  create	  a	  modern	  music	  industry	  that	  is	  struggling	  to	  survive	  and	  evolve	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  free	  market	  forces.	  	  	  	  The	   first	   factor	   that	   helped	   to	   create	   today’s	   complex	   music	   distribution	  system	   is	   the	   compulsory	   license,	   designed	  by	  Congress	   in	   response	   to	   the	  player	  piano	  industry.16	  In	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  player	  piano	  rolls	   did	   not	   count	   as	   copies	   of	   a	   musical	   composition,	   because	   they	   were	   not	  readable	   by	   humans.17	   In	   1909,	   Congress	   overruled	   the	   Court	   by	   amending	  copyright	  law	  to	  define	  copies	  as	  any	  reproductions	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work.18	  Yet,	  because	   Congress	   was	   worried	   that	   a	   then-­‐dominant	   player	   piano	   manufacturer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  legal	  landscape	  surrounding	  the	  different	  streaming	  services,	  see	  Peter	  DiCola	  &	  David	  Touve,	  Licensing	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Copyright,	  17	  STAN.	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  397	  (2014).	  See	  also	  Sofia	  Ritala,	  Pandora	  &	  Spotify:	  Legal	  Issues	  and	  Licensing	  Requirements	  for	  Interactive	  and	  Non-­‐
Interactive	  Internet	  Radio	  Broadcasters,	  54	  IDEA	  23	  (2014).	  	  12	  See	  id.	  	  13	  Lydia	  Pallas	  Loren,	  Untangling	  the	  Web	  of	  Music	  Copyrights,	  53	  CASE	  W.	  RES.	  L.	  REV.	  673	  (2003).	  	  14	  See	  id.	  	  15	  17	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  102	  (2014).	  	  17	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  114	  (2014).	  	  See	  also	  William	  Bee	  Ravanel	  Lewis,	  The	  Next	  
Big	  Hit:	  Protecting	  and	  Exploiting	  (In	  a	  Good	  Way)	  Your	  Musician-­‐Client's	  Intellectual	  Property,	  S.C.	  LAW.,	  July	  2014	  at	  46,	  52.	  	  16	  LAWRENCE	  LESSIG,	  THE	  FUTURE	  OF	  IDEAS:	  THE	  FATE	  OF	  THE	  COMMONS	  IN	  A	  CONNECTED	  WORLD	  109	  (2001).	  17	  White-­‐Smith	  Music	  Pub.	  Co.	  v.	  Apollo	  Co.,	  209	  U.S.	  1	  (1908).	  18	  Act	  of	  Mar.	  4,	  1909,	  ch.	  320,	  35	  Stat.	  1075. 	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would	  buy	  up	  all	   the	  composition	  rights	  and	  monopolize	   the	  player	  piano	  market,	  Congress	   put	   in	   place	   a	   compulsory	   license	   for	   composition	   copyrights.19	   By	   the	  terms	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license,	  anyone	  can	  make	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  composition,	  whether	  by	   creating	   a	   “mechanical”	   copy	  of	   the	   composition	   readable	  by	  player	  pianos,	   by	  recording	  a	  new	  “cover”	  version	  of	  a	  song,	  or	  by	  recording	  the	  song	  on	  CDs	  or	  mp3	  files.20	   The	   copyist	   is	   simply	   required	   to	   pay	   the	   composition	   copyright	   owner	   an	  amount	   per	   copy	   that	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   judges	   appointed	   to	   the	   Copyright	  Royalty	   Board	   (currently	   9.1¢	   per	   song	   for	   songs	   under	   5	   minutes).21	   In	   other	  words,	  for	  every	  CD	  sold,	  or	  album	  downloaded,	  the	  songwriter	  gets	  9.1¢	  per	  song.	  If	  a	  songwriter	  creates	  an	  incredible	  song	  and	  would	  like	  to	  charge	  more,	  she	  cannot.	  If	   a	   songwriter	   writes	   a	   deeply	   personal	   song,	   and	   does	   not	   want	   someone	   else	  recording	   a	   cover	   version,	   there	   is	   nothing	   he	   can	   do	   to	   stop	   it.	   The	   compulsory	  license	   strips	   away	   from	   songwriters	   the	   control	   over	   their	   creations	   that	   every	  other	  artist	  and	  author	  takes	  for	  granted.	  	  	  A	   second	   factor	   affecting	  music	   creation	   and	   dissemination	   is	   the	   separate	  legal	  protection	  that	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  gives	  to	  songwriters	  for	  public	  performances	  of	  their	  compositions.	  When	  a	  song	  is	  performed	  at	  a	  concert,	   in	  a	  bar,	  or	  over	  the	  radio,	   this	   is	   considered	  a	   “public	  performance,”	  which	   songwriters	  have	   separate	  rights	   to	   control.22	   Thus,	   to	   perform	   a	   song	   publicly,	   the	   performer	   must	   get	  permission	   from	   the	   copyright	   owner	   of	   the	   composition.23	   Because	   it	   is	  burdensome	  to	   license	  every	  song	  that	  a	  radio	  or	  TV	  station	  might	  want	  to	  play,	  a	  system	   of	   blanket	   licenses	   arose.24	   The	   vast	   majority	   of	   songwriters	   give	   non-­‐exclusive	   licenses	   to	   their	   composition	   copyrights	   to	   the	   American	   Society	   of	  Composers,	  Authors	  and	  Publishers	  (ASCAP)	  and/or	  Broadcast	  Music,	   Inc.	  (BMI).25	  These	   royalty-­‐collecting	   organizations	   in	   turn	   sell	   blanket	   licenses	   to	   the	  compositions	   in	   their	  catalogs.	  The	   licenses	  allow,	  say,	  CBS	  to	  pay	  a	  single	   fee	  and	  then	  use	  any	  music	  in	  the	  collecting	  agencies’	  catalogs	  in	  a	  national	  news	  show.26	  	  In	  the	  1970s,	  CBS	  challenged	  these	  blanket	  licenses	  as	  anticompetitive	  price	  fixing,	  but	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  they	  were	  not	  anticompetitive	  because	  (a)	  they	   were	   non-­‐exclusive	   licenses	   and	   thus	   did	   not	   foreclose	   directly	   negotiating	  with	  the	  copyright	  holder,	  and	  (b)	  they	  massively	  reduced	  transaction	  costs	  because	  music	  users	  did	  not	  have	  to	  negotiate	  individually	  every	  time	  they	  wanted	  to	  use	  a	  song.27	   Over	   the	   years,	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   (DOJ)	   has	   negotiated	   consent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Id.	  	  20	  17	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  115	  (2014).	  	  	  21	  37	  C.F.R	  §	  380-­‐86	  (2015),	  available	  at	  http://www.loc.gov/crb/laws/title37/.	  	  22	  17	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  106(4)	  (2014).	  23	  Id.	  	  24	  Lydia	  Pallas	  Loren,	  The	  Dual	  Narratives	  in	  the	  Landscape	  of	  Music	  Copyright,	  52	  HOUS.	  L.	  REV.	  537,	  560	  (2014).	  25	  Peter	  Dicola	  &	  Matthew	  Sag,	  An	  Information-­‐Gathering	  Approach	  to	  Copyright	  Policy,	  34	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  173,	  222	  n.267	  (2012).	  	  26	  Loren,	  supra	  note	  24.	  	  27	  Broadcast	  Music	  Inc.	  v.	  Columbia	  Broadcasting	  Sys.,	  441	  U.S.	  1,	  21,	  34	  (1979).	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decrees	  with	  ASCAP	  and	  BMI	  with	  respect	   to	   these	  blanket	   licenses	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  ensure	  moderate	  pricing.28	  	  The	  DOJ’s	  concern	  about	  ASCAP	  and	  BMI	  potentially	  using	  blanket	  licenses	  as	  a	   way	   to	   drive	   up	   prices	   is	   understandable.29	   The	   blanket	   licenses	   inherently	   fix	  song	  prices	  because	  when	  an	  entity	  buys	  a	  blanket	  license	  for	  a	  set	  fee	  per	  month,	  it	  can	   use	   any	   song	   in	   the	   collecting	   organizations’	   catalogs.30	   The	  marginal	   cost	   of	  each	  song	  is	  zero	  once	  a	  blanket	  license	  is	  purchased.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  in	  price	  whether	  songs	  are	  good	  or	  bad,	  popular	  or	  unpopular.	  This	  fixing	  of	  the	  public	  performance	  price	  of	  songs	  destroys	  any	  real	  price	  competition.	  Even	  if	  a	  songwriter	  decided	   not	   to	   allow	   ASCAP	   and	   BMI	   to	   license	   her	   compositions	   and	   instead	  negotiated	   performance	   rights	   directly,	   once	   a	   radio	   station,	   television	   station,	   or	  dance	  club	  has	  paid	  for	  a	  blanket	  license,	  this	  purchaser	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  directly	  for	  higher-­‐priced	  songs	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  license.	  And	  once	  an	  entity	  has	  a	  blanket	  license,	  it	  has	  very	  little	  incentive	  to	  license	  additional	  songs	  individually,	  even	  if	  the	  composition	  copyright	  holder	  offers	  a	  very	  low	  price.	  	  	  The	   third	   factor	   affecting	   the	   complex	   scheme	   of	   music	   distribution	  originates	  from	  a	  law	  that	  Congress	  passed	  in	  1995	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  account	  for	  digital	  distribution	   of	   music.31	   Congress	   decided	   that	   the	   compulsory	   license	   for	   public	  performances	  of	  songwriters’	  compositions	  should	  apply	  to	  streaming	  services.32	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   Congress	   decided	   to	   grant	   sound	   recording	   copyright	   owners	   and	  performers	   a	   public	   performance	   right	   for	   digitally	   streamed	  music,	   and	   to	  make	  this	  right	  subject	  to	  a	  compulsory	  license	  as	  well.33	  The	  sound	  recording	  compulsory	  license	  covers	  only	  “non-­‐interactive”	  Internet	  radio	  and	  “non-­‐interactive”	  streaming	  services	  like	  Pandora.34	  It	  does	  not	  cover	  interactive	  services	  such	  as	  Spotify.35	  This	  is	  why	  Taylor	  Swift	  was	  able	   to	  pull	  her	  music	   from	  Spotify	  but	  not	  Pandora.	  The	  digital	   public	   performance	   right	   and	   accompanying	   compulsory	   license	   carry	   the	  consequence	   that	   sound	   recording	   copyright	   owners	   are	   now	   also	   paid	   for	  streaming	  of	  their	  performances,	  while	  composition	  copyright	  owners	  are	  paid	  for	  the	   underlying	   composition	   (digital	   downloads	   are	   considered	   sales	   rather	   than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Loren,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  562.	  29	  Jay	  M.	  Fujitani,	  Comment,	  Controlling	  the	  Market	  Power	  of	  Performing	  Rights	  Societies:	  An	  
Administrative	  Substitute	  for	  Antitrust	  Regulation,	  72	  CAL.	  L.	  REV.	  103,	  113-­‐14	  (1984)	  (discussing	  the	  ensuing	  lawsuits).	  	  30	  Jonathan	  H.	  Adler,	  Conservation	  Through	  Collusion:	  Antitrust	  as	  an	  Obstacle	  to	  Marine	  Resource	  
Conservation,	  61	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  3,	  67	  (2004).	  	  31	  See	  Digital	  Performance	  Right	  in	  Sound	  Recordings	  Act	  of	  1995,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  104-­‐39,	  109	  Stat.	  336	  (1995).	  32	  See	  id.	  	  33	  See	  id.	  34	  See	  Mary	  LaFrance,	  From	  Whether	  to	  How:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Implementing	  a	  Full	  Public	  Performance	  
Right	  in	  Sound	  Recordings,	  2	  HARV.	  J.	  SPORTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.	  221,	  231	  (2011).	  35	  Neil	  S.	  Tyler,	  Comment,	  Music	  Piracy	  and	  Diminishing	  Revenues:	  How	  Compulsory	  Licensing	  for	  
Interactive	  Webcasters	  Can	  Lead	  the	  Recording	  Industry	  Back	  to	  Prominence,	  161	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  2101,	  2122-­‐23	  (2013)	  (discussing	  how	  this	  state	  of	  matters	  affects	  interactive	  services).	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public	  performances	  and	  are	  paid	  separately).36	  To	  track	  the	  relevant	  numbers	  and	  provide	  payments	   to	  performers	  and	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  owners,	  an	  entity	  called	   SoundExchange	   was	   created.37	   Because	   Congress	   seemed	   to	   envision	  streaming	  services	  as	  a	  mere	  substitute	  for	  terrestrial	  radio,	  it	  fashioned	  the	  related	  compulsory	  license	  fee	  scheme	  in	  a	  way	  that	  results	  in	  very	  low	  payments,	  such	  that	  artists	  are	  paid	  in	  the	  range	  of	  thousandths	  of	  a	  cent	  per	  stream.38	  Congress	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  many	  listeners,	  streaming	  services	  would	  do	  more	  than	  simply	   replace	   terrestrial	   radio—these	   services	   would	   supplant	   the	   purchase	   of	  music.39	  Had	  Congress	  thought	  of	  streaming	  services	  as	  the	  way	  that	  listeners	  would	  “buy”	   the	  music	   they	  want	   to	  hear,	   including	  by	   creating	  playlists,	   it	   surely	  would	  have	   made	   the	   compulsory	   license	   rates	   higher	   to	   compensate	   musicians	  adequately.	  	  	  	  	  Hence,	  one	  sees	  how	  the	  evolution	  of	  copyright	  law,	  and	  the	  three	  factors	  of	  compulsory	   composition	   licenses,	   blanket	   licenses,	   and	   compulsory	   public	  performance	   licenses	  act	   to	   restrict	   the	   rights	  of	  musicians	   to	  negotiate	   the	   terms	  under	  which	  they	  share	  their	  works	  with	  the	  world.	  This	  lack	  of	  control	  has	  led	  to	  a	  market	   imbalance	   that	   is	   threatening	   the	   sustainability	   of	   music	   creation	   and	  distribution.	   It	   also	   singles	   out	   songwriters	   and	   musicians	   from	   other	   copyright	  owners	  by	  not	  letting	  them	  control	  the	  dissemination	  of	  their	  works.	  	  	  
II.	  The	  Music	  Industry	  Today	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Legal	  Change	  	  The	   music	   industry	   is	   increasingly	   focused	   on	   these	   sustainability	   and	  fairness	  issues.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2014,	  Sony/ATV	  Music	  Publishing	  chairman	  and	  CEO	  Marty	   Bandier	   issued	   a	   memorandum	   to	   employees	   that	   called	   the	   streaming	  payments	  from	  providers	  like	  Pandora	  and	  Spotify	  a	  “totally	  unacceptable	  situation	  and	  one	   that	   cannot	  be	   allowed	   to	   continue.”40	  He	  went	  on	   to	   say,	   “I	  will	   not	   rest	  until	   the	  present	   system	   is	   reformed.”41	  The	  government	   itself	   recognizes	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Joshua	  Keesan,	  Note,	  Let	  It	  Be?	  The	  Challenges	  of	  Using	  Old	  Definitions	  for	  Online	  Music	  Practices,	  23	  BERKELEY	  TECH.	  L.J.	  353,	  361-­‐62	  (2008)	  (explaining	  how	  this	  question	  has	  been	  settled).	  37	  Id.	  at	  356,	  367.	  38	  See	  Paul	  Resnikoff,	  A	  Quick	  Summary	  of	  What	  Streaming	  Services	  Are	  Paying	  Artists…,	  DIGITAL	  MUSIC	  NEWS,	  (Dec.	  13,	  2013),	  http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/12/13/quicksummarystreaming.	  We	  previously	  discussed	  this	  issue	  in	  Aloe	  Blacc,	  Irina	  D.	  Manta	  &	  David	  S.	  Olson,	  Music	  Streaming	  
Demands	  New	  Wave	  of	  Licensing	  Rules,	  CHICAGO	  TRIBUNE,	  Apr.	  3,	  2015,	  available	  at	  http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-­‐jay-­‐z-­‐pandora-­‐songwriters-­‐compensation-­‐copyright-­‐justice-­‐perspec-­‐0402-­‐20150403-­‐story.html.	  Pandora	  is	  part	  of	  an	  ongoing	  lawsuit	  involving	  how	  much	  of	  its	  revenue	  it	  has	  to	  pay	  to	  BMI	  for	  streaming	  songs	  from	  BMI’s	  catalog.	  See	  Broadcast	  Music	  Inc.	  v.	  Pandora	  Media	  Inc.,	  13-­‐cv-­‐04037	  (S.D.N.Y.	  May	  28,	  2015)	  (ruling	  that	  Pandora	  must	  pay	  2.5%	  of	  its	  revenue	  to	  BMI).	  	  39	  Eva	  E.	  Subotnik	  &	  June	  M.	  Besek,	  Constitutional	  Obstacles?	  Reconsidering	  Copyright	  Protection	  for	  
Pre-­‐1972	  Sound	  Recordings,	  37	  COLUM.	  J.L.	  &	  ARTS	  327,	  338	  n.62	  (2014)	  (noting	  this	  possibility).	  40	  Christman,	  supra	  note	  8.	  41	  Id.	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existing	  music	   distribution	  model	   is	   unsustainable	   and	   unfair.	   The	   DOJ	   is	   looking	  into	   revising	   the	   current	   consent	   decrees	   with	   ASCAP	   and	   BMI.42	   The	   Copyright	  Office	  issued	  a	  report	   in	  February	  detailing	  the	  problems	  with	  music	   licensing	  and	  recommending	   reforms.43	   Congress	   is	   also	   considering	   other	   proposals	   in	   various	  stages	  of	  development.44	  	  	  What	  is	  not	  being	  discussed,	  but	  should	  be,	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  time	  for	  Congress,	  the	  DOJ,	  and	  collecting	  organizations	  using	  blanket	  licenses	  to	  withdraw	  and	  let	  the	  market	   determine	   the	   future	   landscape	   of	   the	  music	   industry.	   There	  was	   never	   a	  good	  economic	  reason	  to	   treat	  music	  copyrights	  differently	   from	  other	  copyrights.	  And	  with	  the	  current	  state	  of	  technology	  and	  innovation,	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  need	  for	   the	   blanket	   licenses	   that	   fix	   prices	   for	   all	   songs.	   Now	   that	   computerized,	  networked	   systems	   can	   be	   built	   to	   license,	   distribute,	   and	   collect	   payments	   for	  music	  copyrights,	  the	  blanket	  license	  system	  is	  no	  longer	  necessary	  or	  beneficial	  for	  artists	  and	  consumers.	  The	  market	  has	  shown	  its	  interest	  in	  these	  sorts	  of	  ventures,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  shares	  in	  Tidal	  went	  up	  by	  938%	  within	  days	  of	  Jay	  Z’s	  purchase	  of	  the	  service.45	  One	  way	   in	  which	  Tidal	  seeks	  to	  distinguish	   itself	   is	  by	  offering	  high	  fidelity	  recordings,	  dividing	  consumers	  into	  segments	  based	  on	  their	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  sound	  quality.46	  	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  if	  copyright	  owners	  set	  their	  own	  prices,	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  higher	  prices	  for	  some	  popular	  songs	  and	  perhaps	  even	  for	  streaming	  as	  a	  whole.	  There	  is,	  however,	   no	   fundamental	   right	   to	   stream	  all	   the	   songs	  one	  wants	   for	   any	   specific	  fee.47	  We	   let	  owners	  of	   every	  other	  kind	  of	   copyrighted	  work	  negotiate	   their	  own	  market	  prices.	  Allowing	  music	  copyright	  owners	  to	  control	  pricing	  should	  also	  lead	  to	  lower	  fees	  for	  some	  songs	  that	  are	  not	  megahits,	  and	  will	  facilitate	  the	  creation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  See	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  Antitrust	  Consent	  Decree	  Review:	  American	  Society	  of	  Composers,	  Authors	  
and	  Publishers/Broadcast	  Music,	  Inc.,	  http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap-­‐bmi-­‐decree-­‐review.html	  (last	  accessed	  May	  17,	  2015).	  	  43	  See	  U.S.	  Copyright	  Office,	  Copyright	  and	  the	  Music	  Marketplace:	  A	  Report	  of	  the	  Register	  of	  
Copyrights,	  Feb.	  2015,	  http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-­‐and-­‐the-­‐music-­‐marketplace.pdf.	  44	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  these	  is	  the	  proposal	  to	  adopt	  the	  Songwriter	  Equity	  Act.	  See	  Ed	  Christman,	  
Songwriters	  Equity	  Act	  Re-­‐Introduced	  to	  Congress,	  BILLBOARD,	  Mar.	  4,	  2015,	  https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6487798/songwriter-­‐equity-­‐act-­‐introduced-­‐to-­‐congress.	  For	  the	  text	  of	  the	  bill,	  see	  H.R.	  1283	  (114th	  Congress,	  2015-­‐2017),	  https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1283/text	  (last	  updated	  Mar.	  4,	  2015).	  	  45	  Sven	  Nordenstam,	  Aspiro	  Soars	  on	  Tidal	  Launch	  as	  Star-­‐Struck	  Investors	  Miss	  Jay-­‐Z	  Deal,	  REUTERS,	  March	  31,	  2015,	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/jayz-­‐tidal-­‐aspiro-­‐idUSL6N0WX2MI20150331.	  46	  Tidal,	  High	  Fidelity	  Music	  Streaming,	  http://tidal.com	  (advertising	  this	  feature)	  (last	  accessed	  May	  17,	  2015).	  47	  See	  generally	  Theresa	  Bevilacqua,	  Note,	  Time	  to	  Say	  Good-­‐Bye	  to	  Madonna’s	  American	  Pie:	  Why	  
Mechanical	  Compulsory	  Licensing	  Should	  Be	  Put	  to	  Rest,	  19	  CARDOZO	  ARTS	  &	  ENT.	  L.J.	  285	  (2001)	  (critiquing	  the	  existence	  of	  compulsory	  licenses);	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Wakolbinger,	  Note,	  Compositions	  Are	  
Being	  Sold	  for	  a	  Song:	  Proposed	  Legislation	  and	  New	  Licensing	  Opportunities	  Demonstrate	  the	  
Unfairness	  of	  Compulsory	  Licensing	  to	  Towners	  of	  Musical	  Compositions,	  2008	  U.	  ILL.	  L.	  REV.	  803	  (same).	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niche	   services	   that	   distribute	   desired	   music	   to	   consumers	   more	   efficiently.	   Right	  now,	   independent	   music	   producers	   are	   handicapped	   in	   competing	   with	   Top-­‐40	  music	   because	   of	   blanket	   licenses	   and	   compulsory	   licenses,	   so	   these	   producers	  cannot	  effectively	  differentiate	  on	  price.	  If	  we	  remove	  such	  constraints,	  consumers	  are	  likely	  to	  benefit	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  ways,	  some	  of	  which	  we	  can	  foresee,	  and	  others	  of	  which	  we	   have	   yet	   to	   imagine.	  Moreover,	  market	   solutions	  will	   be	   based	   on	   free	  negotiations	   between	   the	   parties,	   with	   supply	   and	   demand—rather	   than	  government	   boards	   and	   lawyers—determining	   prices.	   Music	   and	   its	   distribution	  would	  not	  disappear.	  Nor	   is	   there	  evidence	   that	   the	  majority	  of	  music	   fans	  would	  switch	   to	   illegal	   file	   sharing	   rather	   than	   pay	   a	   bit	   more.	   The	   downloading	   and	  streaming	   services	   have	   proved	   that	   many	   people	   prefer	   paying	   for	   music	   to	  obtaining	   it	   illicitly.48	  At	   the	   end	  of	   the	  day,	   artists	  want	   their	  music	   to	   be	  widely	  enjoyed.	  They	  just	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  what	  price	  they	  are	  paid	  for	  it.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  enable	   songwriters	   to	   earn	   a	   living	   from	   writing	   songs,	   then	   consumers	   will	  ultimately	  get	  less	  of	  what	  they	  are	  not	  paying	  for.49	  	  Some	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   all	   the	   composition	   and	   sound	  recording	  rights,	  added	  to	  the	  intricacy	  of	  the	  music	  business,	  means	  that	  we	  need	  compulsory	   licenses.50	   This	   lack	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   market’s	   ability	   to	   negotiate	  complexity	   is	   not	   borne	   out	   in	   the	   neighboring	   area	   of	   patents,	   however.	   Patents	  sometimes	  overlap	  vastly	  more	  than	  copyrights	  do.	  For	  example,	  manufacturers	  of	  smartphones	   and	   computers	   generally	   have	   to	   obtain	   licenses	   to	   thousands	   of	  patents.51	  But	  Congress	  never	  mandated	  a	  compulsory	  licensing	  system	  for	  patents.	  Instead,	   the	   market	   has	   managed	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   clearing	   patent	   rights	  using	   various	   methods	   such	   as	   cross-­‐licensing,	   patent	   pools,	   licensing	   through	  standard-­‐setting	  organizations,	  and	  simple	  marketplace	  negotiation.52	   If	  makers	  of	  innovative	  goods	  and	  services	  can	  clear	  thousands	  of	  patent	  rights	  and	  continuously	  provide	   better	   and	   cheaper	   products	   to	   consumers,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   that	  participants	   in	  the	  music	   industry	  cannot	  negotiate	  the	  relevant	  copyright	   licenses	  so	   as	   to	   ensure	   better	   and	   cheaper	   distribution	   of	   music.	   Nor	   is	   there	   robust	  evidence	  indicating	  the	  need	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  	  Imagine	   an	   iTunes-­‐	   or	   Spotify-­‐type	   interface	   through	   which	   music	  programmers	   could	   look	   up	   songs	   and	   specific	   prices	   for	   various	   uses.	   Or	   songs	  could	   be	   searched	   by	   price,	   among	   other	   features.	   Commercial	   music	   purchasers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Joe	  Karaganis	  &	  Lennart	  Renkema,	  Copy	  Culture	  in	  the	  US	  &	  Germany,	  http://americanassembly.org/sites/default/files/download/publication/copy_culture.pdf	  (last	  accessed	  May	  17,	  2015).	  49	  See	  Blacc,	  supra	  note	  6.	  50	  See,	  e.g.,	  Neil	  S.	  Tyler,	  Comment,	  Music	  Piracy	  And	  Diminishing	  Revenues:	  How	  Compulsory	  Licensing	  
for	  Interactive	  Webcasters	  Can	  Lead	  The	  Recording	  Industry	  Back	  to	  Prominence,	  161	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  2101	  (2013).	  	  51	  See	  Tun-­‐Jen	  Chiang,	  The	  Reciprocity	  of	  Search,	  66	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  13	  (2013).	  52	  See	  Carl	  Shapiro,	  Navigating	  the	  Patent	  Thicket:	  Cross	  Licenses,	  Patent	  Pools,	  and	  Standard-­‐Setting,	  
in	  1	  INNOVATION	  POLICY	  AND	  THE	  ECONOMY	  119	  (Adam	  Jaffe	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  2001);	  Angela	  Chen	  &	  Ryan	  Knutson,	  Google	  Cuts	  Patent	  Deal	  With	  Verizon,	  WALL	  ST.	  J.,	  (Dec.	  16,	  2014,	  4:34	  PM),	  http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-­‐verizon-­‐enter-­‐patent-­‐cross-­‐license-­‐agreement-­‐1418744777.	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may	  select	  songs	  and	  know	  individual	  prices	  with	  virtually	  the	  same	  ease	  that	  they	  currently	  enjoy	  in	  making	  their	  programming	  selections.	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  much	  more	  variety	  of	  music	  use	  and	  distribution	  than	  we	  currently	  have.	  Members	  of	  the	  industry	   are	   very	   interested	   in	   building	   transformative	   business	   models	   for	  delivering	   music.	   Lucian	   Grainge,	   chairman	   and	   CEO	   of	   Universal	   Music	   Group,	  stated	  in	  his	  year-­‐end	  memorandum	  to	  employees	  that	  his	  major	  goal	  for	  2015	  is	  to	  “transform	  the	  business	   itself	   .	   .	   .	   for	  our	  artists’	  benefit,	  as	  well	  as	   for	  our	  own.”53	  Citing	  the	  need	  to	  create	  a	  sustainable	  future	  for	  musicians,	  Grainge	  set	  out	  the	  goal	  “to	   be	   a	   formative	   player	   in	   shaping	   and	   developing	   the	   music	   platforms	   of	  tomorrow.”54	  The	  interest	  is	  there	  to	  innovate	  in	  the	  music	  industry	  via	  technology	  and	  business	  models.	  It	  is	  time	  for	  copyright	  law	  and	  compulsory	  streaming	  licenses	  to	  stop	  handcuffing	  that	  innovation.	  	  While	  allowing	   the	   free	  market	   to	   function	  would	  eliminate	   the	  price	   fixing	  inherent	   in	   blanket	   and	   compulsory	   licenses,	   it	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   ASCAP,	   BMI,	  Pandora,	  or	  Spotify	  would	  necessarily	  go	  away.	  They	  might	  be	  the	  ones	  to	  build	  the	  new,	   individually	   priced	   platforms.	   Or	   a	   start-­‐up	   company	   may	   spring	   up	   and	  revolutionize	  the	  music	  distribution	  market	  in	  a	  way	  no	  one	  currently	  conceives.	  We	  have	  seen	  this	  type	  of	  thing	  happen	  time	  and	  again	  in	  other	  areas,	  such	  as	  in	  movie	  and	  television	  distribution.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	   It	  is	  time	  for	  Congress	  to	  move	  our	  laws	  into	  the	  digital	  age	  and	  for	  the	  DOJ	  to	  stop	   setting	   rates	   through	   antiquated	   compulsory	   and	   blanket	   licensing	   schemes.	  Allowing	   the	  market	   to	   function	   freely	  will	   incentivize	  musicians	   to	   invest	   efforts	  into	   providing	   us	  with	   their	   best	  work,	   armed	  with	   the	   knowledge	   that	   they	  will	  control	   later	   uses	   of	   and	   compensation	   levels	   for	   their	   creations.	   Sometimes,	   this	  will	  result	  in	  higher	  prices,	  but	  it	  will	  help	  successful	  artists	  make	  enough	  money	  to	  survive,	   thrive,	   and	  provide	   the	  music	   that	   is	   so	  meaningful	   in	   our	   lives.	   At	   other	  times,	   supply	   and	   demand	  mechanisms	  will	   lower	   the	   cost	   of	   music	   distribution,	  especially	  for	  independent	  and	  niche	  music	  markets.	  We	  should	  respect	  musicians’	  rights	   to	   control	   and	   individually	   price	   their	   works	   so	   as	   to	   create	   a	   sustainable	  music	  business	   that	  will	   continue	   to	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  music.	   It	   is	  only	  by	  modifying	  the	  outdated	  policies	  and	  regulations	  currently	   in	  place	  that	  we	  can	  prevent	  both	  further	  damage	  to	  the	  artistic	  process	  and	  the	  discouragement	  of	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  musicians.	  No	  one	  expects	  change	   to	  happen	  overnight,	  but	  songwriters	  cannot	  afford	  for	  lawmakers	  to	  remain	  asleep	  on	  the	  issue.	  It	  is	  time	  for	  Congress	  and	  the	  music	  industry	  to	  wake	  up.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Andrew	  Flanagan,	  Lucian	  Grainge’s	  End-­‐of-­‐Year	  Memo	  to	  Employees:	  ‘It’s	  No	  Longer	  Enough	  to	  
Outperform’,	  BILLBOARD,	  Dec.	  19,	  2014,	  https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6414007/lucian-­‐grainge-­‐umg-­‐end-­‐of-­‐year-­‐memo.	  54	  See	  id.	  
